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How do economic policies and institutions affect job reallocation processes and their  
consequences for productivity growth?  This paper studies the extreme case of economic system 
change and alternative transitional policies in the former Soviet Republics of Russia and Ukraine.  
Exploiting annual industrial census data from 1985 to 2000, we find that Soviet Russia displayed 
job flow behavior quite different from market economies, with very low rates of job reallocation 
that bore little relationship to relative productivity across firms and sectors.  Since liberalization 
began, the pace, heterogeneity, and productivity effects of job flows have increased substantially.  
The increases occurred more quickly in rapidly reforming Russia than in “gradualist” Ukraine, as 
did the estimated effects of privatization and competitive pressures from product and labor 
markets on excess job reallocation and on the productivity-enhancing effects of job flows. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Although measurement of the magnitudes and covariates of job flows across employers 
has recently been the subject of considerable research, most attention has been devoted to 
studying the United States and other developed market economies with rather similar institutional 
structures.  The findings in these studies tend to be broadly consistent across countries, with 
similar measured rates of job creation and destruction, similar cyclical dynamics, and similar 
associations with employer characteristics. 1  Studies of the impact of job reallocation on aggregate 
productivity growth have mostly been carried out in the U.S., and they tend to find a positive 
relationship, although the results depend somewhat on data and measurement methods.2 
How do job reallocation patterns and their consequences for productivity growth vary 
with the economic policy and institutional environment?  Economists’ understanding of these 
issues has been constrained both by the limited variation in policies and institutions and by the 
difficult data requirem ents for such research.  This paper contributes to our understanding by 
exploiting a remarkable context— the transition from central planning in the former Soviet Union.  
Building upon measurement methods introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992, 1999) 
and drawing on annual manufacturing census data from 1985 to 2000, we describe a standard set 
of empirical regularities for Soviet Russia and for transitional Russia and Ukraine: the magnitude 
of job reallocation across employers, the persistence and heterogeneity of firm-level employment 
changes, the variation of job flows with the aggregate cycle, and the relationship of excess job 
reallocation with employer characteristics such as size, average wage, and capital intensity.  A 
particular innovation is an estimation of the effects of privatization and liberalization policies, 
working through competitive pressures from both product and labor markets, on the propensity for 
firms to reallocate jobs.  Our analysis of the productivity consequences of job flows extends 
methods proposed by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), studying the effects from 
reallocation both within and between industries and during both the Soviet and post-Soviet 
periods, and again emphasizing the roles of private ownership and market competition in fostering 
productivity-enhancing job reallocation.  
                                              
1 Nearly all of the research has focused on the manufacturing sector.  See Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992), 
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989a, 1989b), and Leonard (1987) on 
the U.S., Albaek and Sorensen (1998) on Denmark, and Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998) on Canada.  
Roberts (1996) studies job flows in Chile, Columbia, and Morocco, finding somewhat higher flow rates and 
different cyclical fluctuations than in most of the literature, which is surveyed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).  
2 The contributions of job reallocation to productivity growth have been documented by Baily, Bartelsman, and 
Haltiwanger (2001), Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), Griliches and 
Regev (1995), and Olley and Pakes (1996), among others.   Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) discuss the 
methodological issues. 
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Our motivation for examining job flow patterns in the Soviet Union is its very different 
system of employment determination, in which most economic decisions were either planned or 
tightly regulated by government authorities.  The central planning system has been very little 
examined in this context, probably due to the unavailability of data.  The Soviet period also 
represents the common starting point for economic transitions in Russia and Ukraine, the two 
largest countries in the East European and former Soviet region, and two for which comparable 
firm-level data are available.  Our particular interest in a comparative analysis of job reallocation 
in these two countries lies in their quite different reform policies, with Ukraine by all accounts 
following a more “gradualist” path of slower liberalization, privatization, and stabilization than its 
larger neighbor for most of the period since the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union split up.   
More recently, in the late 1990s, Ukraine appears to have been catching up, at least according to 
the aggregate statistics and international financial institution evaluations.  Our analysis therefore 
distinguishes a period of “early reforms” (1992–1996), when the most radical changes were 
introduced and Russia was the clear leader, from the “late reform” period (1996–2000), which 
was a period of less dramatic reforms in Russia while Ukraine recouped most of its lag in policy 
implementation. 
The relevant characteristics of the Soviet economic system and of the two countries’ 
reform policies are discussed further in Section 2 below, but already this brief characterization 
suggests the following important questions: Does a planned economy exhibit less job reallocation 
and a weaker relationship between job reallocation and productivity growth?  Is a more gradualist 
policy in the transition from central planning reflected in a slower or faster pace of job 
reallocation and a better or worse functioning of the labor market, in the sense of the correlation 
of job flows with productivity?  Relative to the socialist period, are the patterns of job flows—
their magnitudes and relationships with firm characteristics—becoming more similar to those 
observed in the West (as summarized, for instance, by Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999)?  How do 
such policy-relevant variables as firm ownership and the extent of competition in product and 
labor markets influence the degree to which job reallocation is productivity -enhancing, and how 
do these patterns compare for Ukraine and Russia?  These are the main questions around which 
we organize our analysis. 
Our database is quite appropriate for addressing these questions, as it covers the universe 
of large and medium-sized industrial firms in each country at the beginning of transition, 
accounting in 1992 for 90.5 percent of officially reported industrial employment in Russia and 
94.1 percent in Ukraine.  Not only the scope, but also the variable definitions are essentially 
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identical across the two countries, as we have constructed the database from original data 
provided by the Russian and Ukrainian State Statistical Committees, which were branches of the 
same organization during the Soviet period and which still employ the same reporting methods as 
they did formerly.  The data, which are further described in an Appendix, contain identical 
measurement concepts for employment, output, and industrial classification, and they permit us to 
construct comparable measures of private ownership and product market and local labor market 
structure. 3  They also have the advantage of long time series: annual observations from 1985 to 
2000 for Russian firms and from 1992 to 2000 for those in Ukraine.  The earlier Russian data 
permit us to trace out longer-term changes from the pre-perestroika Soviet period into the 
transition; given that Ukraine was governed by the same economic and political regime as Russia, 
the 1985–1991 behavior for Ukraine is unlikely to differ substantially from Russia’s, although the 
earlier Ukrainian data are not available for study. 
An important limitation of the data available to us is that they contain information only on 
industrial firms, and for comparability with other studies we further restrict attention to firms in 
the manufacturing sector.  Another constraint is that the data permit no inferences to be drawn 
concerning exit and entry patterns or new small firms, which are likely to be important sources of 
job creation.4  These restrictions imply that our focus in this paper is the set of “old” 
manufacturing firms operating during and inherited from the Soviet period.  Even so delimited, 
the large size of this sector, its importance to the Russian and Ukrainian economies during the 
Soviet period, and the particular difficulties it faces in restructuring suggest that it is a worthwhile 
subject for study.  With respect to these firms, the data provide a nearly ideal setting for 
examining the effects of economic institutions and policies on job reallocation patterns and their 
cons equences for productivity growth.  
Our work builds not only on previous work for the U.S. and other developed market 
economies but also on previous studies of job flows in the transition. 5  While providing valuable 
                                              
3 Cross-country studies of job reallocation behavior are typically fraught by inconsistent definitions and 
measurement methods; see, e.g., the discussion of typical comparability problems and of the harmonization of 
U.S. and Canadian data in Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998).  Our data have the unusual advantages not 
only of fully consistent coverage and definitions across countries, but also a common starting point that 
facilitates an analysis of the changes in behavior following the adoption of different policy reform programs. 
4 Small firms owned by individuals are systematically excluded from these databases, as described in the Data 
Appendix together with more details about the data sources and construction.  Our inability to track entry and 
exit reliably implies that the analysis is restricted to continuing firms, a restriction which is common to all the 
studies of job flows using firm-level data in East European economies. 
5 Studies of job flows using census-type data in Eastern Europe include Acquisti and Lehmann (2000), Brown 
and Earle (2002a), Faggio and Konings (1999), and Konings, Lehmann , and Schaffer (1996); these data typically 
include most medium and large manufacturing firms.  Studies using sample surveys of firms include Bilsen and 
Konings (1998), Brown and Earle (2002b), and Kapeliushnikov (1997).  Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) and 
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information on some of the job flow patter ns in several countries, the studies contain relatively 
little information on either the pre-transition period or the relationship of job flows with 
productivity. 6  Our study is also related to research on developing economies, although most of 
the latter are much less industrialized than Russia and Ukraine, and the research contains few 
examples of studies similar to our own of abrupt policy changes whose impact can be analyzed 
using pre- and post -change data. 7  In the latter vein, a related work is Olley and Pakes’ (1996) 
analysis of the effects of deregulation on productivity growth in the U.S. telecommunications 
equipment sector, the methods from which we draw upon in our productivity analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  To provide further motivation for our 
comparative analysis of job flows in the Soviet Union and in transitional Russia and Ukraine, 
Section 2 provides a brief discussion of employment determination under central planning, of the 
different economic reform programs adopted in the two successor countries, and of the aggregate 
behavior of output and employment during the reform period.  Section 3 then presents our 
calculations of the magnitudes, persistence, and heterogeneity of manufacturing job flows in these 
countries.  Section 4 describes the relationships of employment volatility with employer 
characteristics, including not only such standard variables in the literature as size, capital 
intensity, and average wage, but also private versus state ownership and the structures of the 
firm’s product and local labor markets.  We use simulation methods to compute the partial 
coefficients measuring the effects of these variables on predicted excess job reallocation. 
The relationship of job flows with productivity differentials across firms and industries is 
the subject of Sections 5 and 6.  Our decomposition techniques extend Foster, Haltiwanger, and 
Krizan’s (2001) method to measure the contribution of job flows to sectoral and aggregate 
productivity growth and to estimate the impact of firm characteristics on the relationship of 
employment share growth and firm-level productivity differentials.  The particular focus of 
Section 6 is an assessment of evidence for the hypothesis that privatization and liberalization 
policies have increased the extent to which job flows are productivity-enhancing.  Section 7 
summarizes the results, while the data sources and methods are described in an Appendix.  
                                                                                                                                              
Jurajda and Terrell (2000) use information from individual work histories, including reasons for job separations, 
to estimate job flows. 
6 Only Konings, Lehmann, and Schaffer (1996) have pre -1989 information in their data, which include 1988–
1991 time series on manufacturing firms in Poland, where gradual liberalization started much earlier than in the 
Soviet Union, and “big bang” liberalization occurred already in January 1990.  Haltiwanger and Vodopivec 
(2002) analyze retrospective data in Estonia from 1989 to early 1995, while Jurajda and Terrell (2000) do the 
same for the Czech Republic from 1991 to 1996.  None of these papers study the relationship between job 
reallocation and productivity growth. 
7 An exception is studies of the effects of import liberalization on productivity growth— not on job reallocation 
per se— in Mexico (Tybout and Westerbrook, 1995) and Chile (Pavcnik, 2002). 
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Throughout the analysis, we assess whether the job flow patterns among the manufacturing firms 
in our data have changed from the Soviet to the post-Soviet period and from the first half of the 
reform period (1992 –1996) to the second half (1996–2000)—that is, whether they are moving in 
the direction of patterns characteristic of market economies and whether they have become 
increasingly productivity-enhancing—and we conduct tests for differences in behavior across the 
two countries. 
2. Soviet Planning, Post-Soviet Reforms, and Implications for Job Reallocation  
How would one expect job flow patterns to look during the Soviet period?  Under central 
planning, most variables that we think of as business decisions — output, product variety, prices, 
technology, wages, and investment levels—were either specifically planned or indirectly 
controlled.8  Enterprises had strong incentives to meet planned output targets, but little incentive 
to contain costs, to innovate, or to produce goods of value.  There was no effective competition, 
no business ownership, no entry, and only regulated imports.  Thus, the usual factors that might be 
supposed to influence employment decisions were largely absent. 
Furthermore, worker mobility was restricted by a number of practices, and enterprises had 
rather little discretion in their decisions on employment. 9  Sometimes employment levels were 
fixed explicitly, but the central planners’ usual method of constraining employment, particularly 
in the later Soviet period, was to set a maximum fund available for an enterprise’s total wage bill 
while specifying wage rates according to just a few criteria, such as occupation and industry.  
There were also constraints on the ability of firms to fire workers, although layoffs were not 
completely unknown.  Arguably, however, the constraints on employment were due more to the 
planners’ fear of excessive hiring than of firing, or of unemployment, as a number of factors—
including soft budget constraints, planned output targets, and unreliable input supplies —combined 
to produce continual excess demand for labor (Kornai, 1992). 
How well did the socialist planners do in allocating labor across alternative uses?  
Frequently the objectives of the plan included political objectives, among them the prestige of 
rapid industrialization and of large, impressive projects, but the planners were also concer ned with 
output and thus with productive efficiency.  Besides having to overcome the political objectives 
and the whims of the Communist Party leaders, however, a major problem in implementing the 
efficiency objective was lack of information, itself due to inherent features of the system: fixed 
                                              
8 For a comprehensive overview of the socialist system, see Kornai (1992). 
9 For a discussion of labor allocation in the Soviet Union, see Granick (1987).  Gregory and Collier (1988) 
discuss Soviet unemployment, which appears to have been very low (although non-zero). 
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prices and wages, and perverse incentives to innovate and to reveal information on productive 
capacities. 
This discussion implies that the incentives and frictions of the socialist system might 
create very different patterns of job flows compared to those that have been documented in 
developed market economies.  Job flows are likely to be smaller, less heterogeneous, and less 
closely associated with variables representing adjustment costs.  The lack of information mig ht 
have prevented central planners from reallocating employment from lower productivity to higher 
productivity enterprises, although how well they actually performed is an empirical question—a 
very interesting one that we can address with our data. 
Turning to the transitional period, the factors affecting job flows would seem to be quite 
different from those in the Soviet Union.  The abolition of constraints on employment leaves firms 
free to choose their own employment levels in principle, as liberalization more broadly permits 
enterprises—even thos e remaining in state ownership—to make most decisions autonomously.  
The extent to which firms actually adjust employment in response to changes in their 
environment, however, is likely to be a function of such factors as the strength of competitive 
pressures, the objectives of the state or new owners, the effectiveness of corporate governance by 
the owners, and the information conveyed by prices and wages.  These factors in turn are 
influenced by the specific des ign of policies of liberalization, privatization, and stabilization that 
were adopted to initiate the transition to a market economy (e.g., Lipton and Sachs, 1990; 
Blanchard et al., 1991), as well as a variety of other policies (for instance, concerning layoffs and 
unemployment) and institutional development. 
The pace and design of such policy reforms after the break -up of the Soviet Union 
differed substantially between Russia and Ukraine, the two largest Soviet successor states.  
Although the policy changes in both were rapid and radical by the standards of most countries, 
Ukraine by all accounts initially followed a more “gradualist” path than its larger neighbor in the 
early and mid 1990s, while by the end of the decade there appears to have been substantial 
convergence in policies.  Concerning the earlier period, for instance, the World Bank (1996) 
provided rankings of transitional economies according to the “extent of economic liberalization,” 
placing Russia almost at the top (just behind Kyrgyzstan) of the CIS countries, in front of 
Bulgaria, and well ahead of China and Vietnam.  Ukraine’s rank was considerably lower, placing 
it in the “least advanced” group of reformers together with Belarus and most of the Central Asian 
Republics. 
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The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provides other ratings 
of “progress in transition” along several different dimensions, and in a time series from 1992 to 
2001.  The scale for each dimensions is from 1 (denoting “unreformed”) to 4.3 (denoting a 
“market economy standard”).  The 1992 scores given for both price liberalization and foreign 
exchange and trade liberalization were 3.0 for Russia and 1.0 for Ukraine.  Only in 1995 did 
Ukraine’s score rise to 3.0 (EBRD, 1998), converging with Russia’s.10 
Concerning privatization, both countries used some form of voucher privatization method 
with substantial preferences for employees, but Russia’s pace was much faster.  Most Russian 
industrial enterprises had been majority privatized firms by July 1994, while Ukraine proceeded 
much more gradually.  Moreover, insider buyouts and collective worker ownership were still 
more important in Ukraine than in Russia.11  Already in 1992, the EBRD (2001) awarded Russia a 
score of 2.0 for large privatization, while Ukraine received only 1.0.  Russia’s score reached 3.0 in 
1993 and 3.3 in 1997 (the same as Poland, and ahead of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Romania), while Ukraine’s reached only 2.3 (behind Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, F.Y.R. 
Macedonia, Moldova, and Uzbekistan).  The Ukrainian privatization score then remained at this 
level until 2000, at which time it rose to 2.7, just behind Russia’s. 
The EBRD (1998) also estimated that the private sector in 1993 already accounted for 40 
percent of Russian GDP but only 15 percent of Ukraine’s.  In 1998, the figures were 70 percent in 
Russia, toward the top end of all transitional economies, but only 55 percent in Ukraine, around 
the bottom.  By 2000, the estimate for Ukraine reached 60 percent, again showing convergence 
toward Russia.  
Concerning stabilization, while the reported price inflation in Russia reached high rates by 
any standards, it pales in comparison to Ukraine’s hyperinflation during most of this period:  
cumulating the annual CPI inflation reported in  EBRD (2001) for the years 1992–2000 yields a 
total price increase of 9,442 percent in Russia and 108,664 percent in Ukraine. 12  By the late 
1990s, however, official inflation rates were much more similar in the two countries (for instance, 
14.8 percent in Russia and 15.9 percent in Ukraine in 1997). 
                                              
10 The EBRD does not provide ratings for labor market liberalization, but anecdotal evidence indicates that this 
process has also been somewhat uneven in the successor states, in particular as local governments have 
frequently attempted to interfere with mass layoffs and with inward migration through systems of permits 
(propiski).  See Gimpelson and Lippoldt (2001) and Kapeliushnikov (2001) for detailed discussions of Russian 
labor market behavior and policies. 
11 See IMF (1999) or Pivovarsky (2001) for discussions of privatization in Ukraine, and Boycko, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1993) or Earle and Estrin (1997) for Russia. 
12 According to Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (2002), Ukraine’s experience meets the classic definition of 
hyperinflation from April 1991 to November 1994, the second longest period of hyperinflation in postwar 
history. 
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Regardless of the exact figures, which are certainly subject to measurement errors and 
disputes, the clearly different pattern of policy choices in the two countries suggests an interesting 
set of comparative hypotheses.  If a quicker and more effective implementation of transitional 
policies tends to stimulate reallocation, then Ukraine’s gradualist policy is likely to be reflected in 
a slower move away from the Soviet patterns, and Russia’s job flows should increase more 
quic kly than those of Ukraine.  Russia would also be more likely than Ukraine to display the 
cyclical behavior and strong correlations of job reallocation with variables such as firm size, 
average wage, and capital intensity that have been found in the West.  The effects of private 
ownership and of product and labor market competition are also likely to be stronger in more 
rapidly reforming Russia, due to the greater levels of inside ownership and less rapid 
liberalization in Ukraine.  Concerning the relationship between job flows and relative firm 
productivity, Russia may display a greater tendency for job reallocation to enhance productivity 
than Ukraine, while the effects of privatization and market competition on the extent to which job 
reallocation is productivity-enhancing should be greater in the former than the latter. 13 
Because the Russian and Ukrainian policies had converged to a considerable extent by the 
late 1990s, however, the differences across countries may be attenuated or eliminated by the end 
of the period.  In order to examine how these differences varied over the transition, our analysis in 
this paper divides the total time period not only into a Soviet and a post-Soviet period, but also the 
latter into subperiods designated “early reform” (1992–1996) and “late reform” (1996–2000).  In 
general, this discussion suggests that the impact of reforms on the pace of job flows, their 
relationship with firm characteristics, and the extent to which they are productivity-enhancing 
should be large in Russia during early reforms, while Ukraine should exhibit similar patterns only 
during the late reform period. 
Finally, we present aggregate statistics on industrial production and employment as 
additional useful background and motivation for our analysis.  The aggregate data, shown in 
Figure 1, clearly indicate that job destruction has far outweighed job creation in the industrial 
sectors of both countries during the transitional period.  Figure 1 shows the evolution of industrial 
employment in the two countries over 1992–2000, including a remarkable fall by 1999 of 39 
percent in Ukraine and 35 percent in Russia, followed by a small increase in 2000.  Although 
                                              
13 An alternative possibility is that more cautious, gradual policies are more successful at stimulating productive 
reallocation, and that overly rushed transitional programs lead to unemployment rather than genuine reallocation, 
as in the literature on the optimal speed of transition (see, e.g., Aghion and Blanchard, 1994; Boeri and Terrell, 
2002), or in Caballero and Hammour’s (1996) discussion of “hyperkinesis.”  We discuss the possibility that job 
flows are unassociated or negatively associated with productivity growth below. 
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large by any standard, the employment drop was nonetheless substantially exceeded by the fall in 
output  of 52 percent in Ukraine and 39 percent in Russia, resulting in an initially sharp decline in 
productivity followed by a gradual recovery.14 
These aggregate patterns may be unsurprising to anyone familiar with recent 
developments in the East European region, but little is known about the character of the massive 
job destruction.  Does it represent a “cleansing recession” in the sense of Caballero and Hammour 
(1994), whereby the economy rids itself of its least efficient jobs?  Alternatively, does it represent 
a simple aggregate downturn, in which all firms downsize equally, or at least without regard to 
productivity, due to a common negative shock?  Finally, is it rather the case that the job 
destruction is concentrated among the better, more efficient firms in industry, suggesting 
“sclerosis” (Caballero and Hammour, 1996, 2000), in which unproductive jobs survive due to 
market imperfections and government policies?  In both Ukraine and Russia, there may be 
compelling reasons to suspect some sclerotic forces at work, as the governments have frequently 
engaged in direct subsidization and other forms of support for weak and failing firms, while 
discriminatory taxes, bureaucratic interference, poor contract enforcement, and uncertain property 
rights protection have impeded those that are more successful (e.g., Frye and Shleifer, 1997; 
Aslund, Boone, and Johnson, 1996).  The view that the economic transition has destroyed the 
better, more productive parts of the industrial sector is far from uncommon in these countries, 
although it is usually associated with nostalgia for the Soviet period.  In this paper, we provide 
evidence on the character of the reform-induced resource reallocation through an analysis relating 
the job flows to firm-level productivity measures in these countries. 
The aggregate statistics in Figure 1 also imply the possibility to analyze the cyclical 
properties of the job flows.  While undergoing rapid institutional change, these countries 
experienced a severe aggregate contraction and the beginnings of what appears to be an expansion 
phase.  By dividing the 1992–2000 period into two halves, we are able to provide some analysis 
of the job flow patterns over these countries’ first postsocialist business cycle.  An examination of 
the relationships between the firm-level patterns and the aggregate cyclical patterns provides 
another dimension for addressing our basic question on the degree to which job flow patterns in 
these two economies are converging toward those in developed market economies. 
                                              
14 The magnitudes of the reported declines in real output should be treated with caution, as price changes may be 
overstated (due to quality improvements) and quantity changes may be understated (due to growth in the 
informal economy); Campos and Coricelli (2002) summarize some of these issues. 
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3. Job Flows in Russian and Ukrainian Manufacturing 
The job flow concepts in this paper follow the definitions of Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1990, 1992, 1999), but we use regression analysis to calculate the flow rates and the precision of 
the estimates.  Information on statistical precision is important in comparing the rates across 
countries and assessing the impact of potential determinants of job flows.  The dependent 
variables in the regressions are as follows: job creation (JC), the net employment change for 
growin g firms and zero otherwise; job destruction (JD ), the absolute value of the net employment 
change for contracting firms and zero otherwise; net employment change (NC); and job 
reallocation (JR), the absolute value of NC.  We also calculate excess job reallocation (XJR ) for 
any set of observations as twice the smaller of the size-weighted mean JC or JD for that set.  All 
of these job flows are converted into rates by dividing by average employment across the two 
years.  The observations in the flow regressions are weighted by each firm’s average share of 
employment in its country’s industrial registry in the corresponding pair of years. 
For comparability with others’ findings and in order to provide detailed information on the 
time pattern of changes in the job flows, we present estimated regressions for the pooled sample, 
1992–2000, including year effects interacted with Russian and Ukrainian country dummies.  The 
results from these estimations are shown in the upper panel of Table 1.  Conventional t-tests of  
differences between Ukrainian and Russian flow rates are also indicated. 
A second approach facilitates a more compact examination of the impact of reforms and 
the extent of convergence to Western job flow patterns.  The regressions in the bottom panel of 
Table 1 show the results from including dummies for three distinct time periods: 1985–1992 (the 
Soviet period), 1992–1996 (the turbulent period of early reforms), and 1996–2000 (the late reform 
period, when the most radical changes had already been enacted).  The differences across 
countries are tested by interacting each of the latter two time period dummies with Russian and 
Ukrainian country dummies.  This specification permits the effects of firm characteristics to vary 
over a total of five country-perio ds:  Soviet Russia, Early Reform Russia, Early Reform Ukraine, 
Late Reform Russia, and Late Reform Ukraine.  
The results for net employment growth in these data mirror the aggregate industry time 
series in Figure 1, being negative every year from 1992 to 1999 in both countries, with the largest 
declines in the mid 1990s.  Only in the last period, 1999 –2000, which saw the only substantial 
growth in industrial production since the breakup of the Soviet Union, does net employment 
 11 
change become positive in Russ ia, while the magnitude of the decline in Ukraine falls 
substantially. 15 
Our computation of the job creation rate is negligible in Russian manufacturing during the 
Soviet period, and in both countries it grows moderately through the 1990s in the firms inherited 
from the Soviet Union.  Only in 1999–2000 does JC pass 6 percent for the Russian firms, 
reaching the bottom end of the range of creation rates of the full manufacturing sectors in the U.S. 
and other market economies; in Ukraine it remains mired at a very low level. 16  Indeed, JC in the 
first years after reforms is rather similar in the two countries but becomes sharply higher in Russia 
for most of the period thereafter. 
The calculated job destruction is also very low in the Soviet period, but in the old firms of 
both Russian and Ukrainian manufacturing the rate rises rapidly in the early reform period, 
quickly reaching the typical range of rates found in the U.S.  From initially similar levels in 1992–
1993, JD increases more quickly in Russia but then decreases in the late reform period, while 
Ukraine’s JD remains high.  
Following the creation and destruction trends, JR  initially increases and then remains 
fairly constant.  In 1992–1993, the level of JR is not greatly different between the firms in the two 
countries, but in 1993 –1994 it is already much higher in Russia, while in the later years it is 
higher in Ukraine.  Excess job reallocation (XJR) is also rather similar at the beginning of the 
1990s and then rises steadily in both countries, but it becomes substantially higher in Russia.  
Thus, the job flows since 1992 show a general pattern of starting at comparable levels for the old 
manufacturing firms in the two countries, then diverging in the middle and late 1990s, and 
partially reconverging toward the end of the period.  
The cyclical relationships among the components of job flows have received considerable 
attention in the Western literature.  In a study of the U.S. and Canadian manufacturing sectors, for 
instance, Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998) report a simple correlation between job 
                                              
15 The official statistics on aggregate industrial employment (in Figure 1) imply employment growth in both 
countries from 1999 to 2000, but these include estimates of employment in new small firms and incorporate 
other “expert opinions” of the State Statistical Committees.  A further difference from the official aggregates on 
industry employment is that our calculations pertain only to the manufacturing sector; when we include the 
nonmanufacturing firms in the registry, the employment growth rates look very similar to the official aggregates, 
seldom differing by more than one percentage point. 
16 Note again that our results pertain to the old manufacturing sector, and that it is likely that if job creation by 
entering firms could be measured, then the Russian rate would be still higher than 6 percent.  As a benchmark, 
note that Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1999, p. 2721) summary of annual gross job creation rates range from 6.2 to 
12.1 percent for the full manufacturing sectors of various market economies, but they also emphasize that all job 
flows are negatively related to firm age and size.  The figures in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p. 61), 
for instance, imply that all flows are more than 50 percent higher for firms with fewer than 100 employees t han 
for those that are larger. 
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creation and destruction of –0.291 in Canada and –0.676 in the U.S.  Our calculation of this 
correlation for Soviet Russia actually shows a positive relationship (0.162), however.  The 
correlation becomes highly negative in our data for post reform Russia (-0.891), and it is also 
negative in postreform Ukraine (-0.338).  A second finding from Western studies is a higher 
volatility of job destruction than of job creation, and Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998) 
report the ratio of the variance of destruction to creation as 1.5 in Canada and 2.1 in the U.S.  This 
relationship also holds in our data, but the relative volatility of destruction is much higher in 
Soviet Russia (13.7), falling after reforms to a level similar to that in North Amer ica (1.3), while 
Ukraine’s postreform ratio is a bit higher (2.5). 
The data, therefore, do appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that job flows reflect 
economic institutions and policies.  Soviet Russia exhibits very low job flow rates, consistent with 
both the constraints placed on employment by central planners and the lack of incentives for 
employment adjustments.  The relationships among some of the flows are quite different from 
those found in developed market economies.  After reforms begin, both the magnitudes of the 
flows in our data and the relationships among them converge toward Western patterns.17  The data 
also show substantial differences between behavior of firms in Russia and Ukraine.  Starting from 
a similar position in 1992, firms in more rapidly reforming Russia begin to exhibit much greater 
levels of job reallocation than in more slowly reforming Ukraine during the early transitional 
period.  Furthermore, job creation grows much more quickly in Russia, and the magnitude of net 
employment decline is smaller.  These findings suggest that Russia’s policy came closer to 
producing an “optimal speed of transition,” and, at least for the old manufacturing sectors of these 
two countries, the data suggest that more aggressive reforms, rather than a gradualist strategy, are 
more likely to enhance restructuring. 
Do these flows persist, suggesting that longer-term restructuring is at work, or do they 
reflect temporary deviations of employment that tend to be reversed subsequently?  Table 2 
documents the persistence rates of the job flows, i.e., the extent to which jobs added or subtracted 
from the firm remain gained or lost in future years.  Persistence rates are calculated for one- and 
two-year periods, and both have fallen slightly during the reform period by comparison with 
Soviet socialism.  Apparently, the planners had little tendency to reverse their decisions on 
changing employment levels!  As in other countries, the persistence rate is lower for JC than for 
JD, but for the latter it is quite high by international standards.  Thus, while creation persistence 
                                              
17 The increased flows are consistent with the findings for some other East European economies:  Konings, 
Lehmann, and Schaffer (1996) for Poland from 1988 to 1991, Jurajda and Terrell (2000) for the Czech Republic 
from 1991 t o 1996, and Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) for Estonia from 1989 to 1995. 
 13 
falls substantially during the transition, the measured flows do not appear to be the result of highly 
volatile behavior or noise in the data:  they are not prim arily temporary phenomena, and they are 
even less so under central planning than in the transition. 
A final question in our description of the job flows in our data concerns the heterogeneity 
of job flow behavior, which Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and others have emphasized in their 
research on the U.S. economy.  A first step in our analysis of these issues in the Soviet transition 
is an examination of the distribution of firm-level employment growth rates, shown in Table 3.  In 
the periods under consideration, the rates become progressively more heterogeneous in both 
countries.  Though employment declined in over half the firms, an increasing proportion actually 
enjoyed employment gains.  In the early reform period, the Russian employment growth 
distribution displays much higher heterogeneity than does the Ukrainian, while the latter widens 
significantly only in the later reform period, partially converging with Russian behavior. 
It is useful to compare the level of employment growth heterogeneity in our data with 
Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992) findings for the U.S. manufacturing sector.  They report that 29 
percent of continuing establishments experience a percentage growth rate in the interval of (-5,+5) 
and 53 percent lie in the interval (-15,+15). 18  Our analogous calculations around median 
employment growth in our data reveal a much less heterogeneous distribution in Soviet Russia, 
where 58 percent of firm growth rates lie in the (-5,+5) interval and 87 percent in the (-15,+15) 
interval.19  The distribution widened dramatically with reforms, as these intervals account for only 
28 and 62 percent of the distribution in early reform Russia and 34 and 73 percent in early reform 
Ukraine, respectively.  Again the data imply that behavior in the old manufacturing firms of both 
countries moved substantially in the direction of a market economy, but Ukraine’s progressed at a 
slower rate than Russia’s did through most of the 1990s. 20 
Some of the variation in employment growth is associated with differences in behavior 
across industries, which are grouped into broad manufacturing sectors in Table 4.  Average JC is 
actually higher than JD in the fuel sector, while machine building’s JD is much larger than its JC  
by a factor of 12 in Ukraine and 7.6 in Russia.  The patterns of differences across sectors are very 
                                              
18 The figures actually reported by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) include establishment births and deaths, 
accounting for 14 percent of their annual growth rate observations.  Because our data pertain to continuing firms, 
we have rescaled their figures, dividing by 0.86. 
19 Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) report their figures for ranges of the distribution centered around zero, which 
appears to be the median growth rate in their data; we therefore center the ranges for our calculations around the 
medians in our data, but the qualitative conclusions would be unaffected by centering around zero. 
20 And again we should note that our calculations pertain to a set of firms that is larger and older than the 
universe, and the heterogeneity of growth rates would most likely be even higher if we were able to include 
small start -ups in our calculations. 
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similar in the two countries:  the Pearson correlation coefficients are 0.831 for JC and 0.889 for 
JD.  These are very similar to Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger’s (1998) analogous estimates for 
U.S. and Canadian two-digit manufacturing industries:  0.854 for JC and 0.835 for JD.21 
The extent to which industry differences account for the heterogeneity can be examined 
using Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992) decomposition of XJR into its intra- and inter-industry 
components.  For this purpose, Table 5 uses five-digit industries, of which there are usually 260 in 
a given year of our data.  Similar to the results for the U.S., the results imply that most XJR  occurs 
within rather than between five-digit industries.  In some years, however, inter-industry XJR  is 
quite high, particularly in 1995–1996 and 1999–2000.  The average levels for the early reform 
period of 1992 –1996 are greater than any of the estimates for comparable sets of industries in the 
country studies reported in Davis and Haltiwanger (1999, Table 5).  This finding suggests that 
inter-industry flows may be relatively large in the reallocation process of the early transition, 
although the intra-industry flows still dominate.   
4. Job Flows and Employer Characteristics 
The previous section provided evidence that job flows in Russian and Ukrainian 
manufacturing during the transitional period changed significantly relative to their Soviet origins, 
becoming much larger and substantially more heterogeneous across firms.  Is this heterogeneity 
associated with firm characteristics?  Relevant characteristics investigated by Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992, 1999) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) include size, average wage, 
and capital intensity, variables that are usually motivated as proxies for adjustment costs in 
employment. 
To these characteristics, our analysis in this section adds firm ownership (state versus 
private) and dispersion in the product market and local labor market in which the firm operates.  
Firm ownership is a particularly interesting factor in the transitional setting because its effects 
reflect privatization policies, working through changes in corporate governance and management 
to increase enterprise restructuring.  The privatization policies were rather different in the two 
countries, as the Ukrainian process took place more gradually and gave even less scope for 
ownership by non-employee outside investors than it did in Russia.  If employee-owners are less 
                                              
21 The estimates in Baldwin, Dunne, and Haltiwanger (1998) are based on slightly more disaggregated industries 
than those shown in our Table 4, but their precise level of aggregation is difficult to replicate in our data because 
of a different system of industrial classification. 
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likely to reallocate jobs, then we might expect a smaller impact of private ownership in Ukraine 
than in Russia. 22 
Our analysis of local labor market dispersion is motivated by the fact that both countries 
are quite large and have many localities that may be characterized as “one-company towns.”  In 
such locations, firms may face a steeply rising labor supply function, as workers’ restricted 
outside options make them more willing to accept wage cuts to maintain employment, while 
hiring additional employees requires inducing nonparticipants to enter the labor force or drawing 
workers to move or commute from other regions.  The variation in local employment dispersion 
offered by our data provides an interesting possibility for testing such monopsony effects.   
Concerning liberalization policies, which pertain to prices, wages, business entry, imports, 
and restrictions on mobility and commerce, Ukraine appears to have proceeded more slowly than 
Russia, at least according to the World Bank (1996) and the EBRD (1998, 2001), as discussed in 
Section 2 above.  Thus, we may expect that the competitive pressure inherent in a given market 
structure is stronger in Russia than Ukraine. 
Table 6 provides summary statistics for the main characteristics used in the analysis.  In 
Russia, information on ownership is available for each firm-year only in the form of a dummy 
variable for majority private ownership, Private; thus we define a similar dummy for Ukraine 
based on information concerning share ownership.  During the Soviet period, the mean of this 
variable is of course zero, but consistent with the evaluations of the international financial 
institutions, discussed in Section 2 above, a much larger fraction of Russian enterprises was 
already majority private in the early reform period: 48.9 percent of firm-year observations, 
compared with 11.7 percent in Ukraine.  By the late reform period, the private share had risen 
dramatically in both countries: 81.4 percent in Russia and 46.8 percent in Ukraine.  Private is 
included in the regression as the value for year t-1 to explain flows from year t-1 to year t. 
To control for preprivatization behavior in the regressions, we also define a dummy 
variable Ever Private as equal to one if the firm is majority private by 2000, or by the last year it 
appears in the database.  The mean of this variable is also shown in Table 6, the slight variation 
over time merely reflecting the small changes in the sample across the different periods.  
Including Ever Private in the regressions implies that the Private effect is estimated by 
regression-adjusted difference-in-differences.23 
                                              
22 Measuring private ownership is not without ambiguities in this setting, where for instance partially state-
owned entities hold shares in other  partially privatized entities.  Our data, however, provide us only with 
information on direct shareholding, which we use to measure majority private ownership. 
23 The ownership status of firms in these data does not shift back from private to state ownership. 
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The two dimensions of competitive pressure, domestic product market and local labor 
market, are measured as dispersion indices.  Our measure of domestic product market dispersion 
follows Brown and Earle’s (2002a) method of using data at both the national and regional levels 
to account for different geographic market sizes across industries.  The premise of the method is 
that the geographic scope of the market in an industry is reflected in the degree to which 
producers in the industry are located across different regions of the country.  For instance, an 
industry with member firms in all regions is likely to have regional markets, and an industry with 
firms in only a few regions is likely to be a national market.  To implement a mixed dispersion 
measure, we first calculate the opposite of the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index for each industry at the regional and national levels.  These regional and national dispersion 
measures are then combined into a single index, Product Market Dispersion, by taking their 
weighted sum, with the weight on the regional dispersion measure is the proportion of regions 
with at least one firm in industry j in year t, and the weight on the national dispersion measure is 
one minus this proportion.  To measure local Labor Market Dispersion, we similarly calculate the 
opposite of the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for local industrial 
employment concentration in each municipality in Russia and county (raion) in Ukraine.  Table 6 
provides the means and standard deviations of these measures, showing a steady decline in 
Product Market Dispersion in both countries, and somewhat lower dispersion in Ukraine than in 
Russia.  The Labor Market Dispersion  measures are s imilar in both countries and show no distinct 
trends over time.  Both the product and labor market dispersion indices from year t-1 are included 
in the regressions to explain flows between years t-1 and t.  
Table 6 also includes descriptive statistics for the size variable, average employment over 
years t and t-1, which is higher at the mean in Russia than in Ukraine.  Together with capital 
intensity and the average wage, size is examined because of its possible association with fixed 
costs of labor adjustment, due for instance to higher hiring costs or more firm-specific human 
capital. 24  A second effect of the firm’s average wage could arise due to the turbulent nature of 
industrial change in which expanding firms may need to offer substantial wage premia to attract 
additional workers.  Our construction of both the capital intensity and average wage variables 
follows Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) in constructing a ranking of all firms in a given country-
year and scaling the ranking from 0 to 1. 25  So constructed, the capital intensity and average wage 
                                              
24 Oi’s (1962) analysis of labor as a quasi-fixed factor used the average wage of a group of workers as a proxy 
for the costs of hiring and training.  
25 The details of the data construction are given in the Appendix.  Because the regressions use scaled variables, 
we do not present their summary statistics. 
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effects suffer less from problems associated with deflating the monetary values and with 
comparing these measures across Russia and Ukraine; they are measured in year t-1 to explain 
flows between years t-1 and t. 
The regressions also include five-digit industry fixed effects to control for any time-
invariant heterogeneity across industries in flow rates that might be correlated with the variables 
of interest.  The impact of reforms and the extent of convergence to Western job flow patterns are 
again assessed by including five period-country effects: Soviet Russia, Early Reform Russia, 
Early Reform Ukraine, Late Reform Russia, and Late Reform Ukraine.  In these regressions, the 
period-country dummies are interacted with the employer characteristics to permit the estimated 
effects of the latter to vary.  
We calculate XJR coefficients for each firm characteristic separately by computing 
simulations of the impact of a one standard deviation change around the mean in each continuous 
firm characteristic on the predicted XJR , and a change from zero to one in the case of a firm 
characteristic that is a dummy.  Variables representing all other firm characteristics are assigned 
their true values. 26  Two natural exceptions to this procedure result from the logical connection of 
the variables Private and Ever Private: we set Private = 0 when calculating the effect of Ever 
Private, so that Ever Private captures the preprivatization effect; and we condition the effect of 
Private on Ever Private = 1, so that the coefficient for  Private represents the effect of 
privatization on firms that are actually privatized. 
To explain our method more formally, taking the example of Private, we first predict JR  
conditional on private ownership for each firm i from the fitted equation (estimated by ordinary 
least squares – OLS):  
 γα ˆˆˆ| ippi Zr += , (1) 
where pir |ˆ  is predicted reallocation conditional on private ownership, pα̂ is the OLS estimate of 
the private effect, Zi is a matrix of firm i’s true values for the other firm characteristics (with Ever 
Private = 1), and γ̂  is the associated vector of coefficient estimates. 27  The subscript |p indicates 
that the calculation is conditioned on private ownership.  Predicted  NC conditional on private 
ownership is 
 ϕβ ˆˆˆ | ippi Zg += , (2) 
                                              
26 This procedure differs from that employed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), whose calculations are 
conditioned on the median values of all other variables.  
27 These calculations are performed for each year separately, but the year subscript is dropped in the text to 
reduce the complexity of the notation. 
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where pβ̂ is the estimated private effect and ϕ̂  is again the vector of coefficient estimates 
associated with the variables in Z i.  Predicted XJR for each firm conditional on private ownership, 
pix |ˆ , can then be obtained from  
 ( )pipipi gabsrx ||| ˆˆˆ −= , (3) 
where abs is the absolute value operator. 
Predicted XJR conditional on state ownership, six |ˆ , is computed similarly: 
 ( ) )ˆ(ˆˆˆˆ ||| ϕγ iisisisi ZabsZgabsrx −=−= , (4) 
which differs from pix |ˆ in that pα̂  and pβ̂ , the private effects, drop out.  The XJR coefficient is 
then defined as the weighted average of the difference in predicted excess reallocation across all N  
firms in the sample: 












∆ ∑  , (5) 
where is  is the mean share of firm i  in total employment.  P
x
∆
∆ˆ  is our measure of the difference in 
XJR associated with private versus state ownership.  These simulations are conducted separately 
for each of the five country-periods. 
Table 7 displays the resulting estimates of the XJR  coefficients.  Beginning with 
ownership, the results for the Ever Private dummy in Soviet Russia imply that firms that would be 
privatized later exhibit greater XJR  during the Soviet period; the estimated coefficients for this 
variable vary across country-periods because the sample of not yet privatized firms is changing.  
Of greater interest is the effect of Private while controlling for Ever Private.  In the early reform 
period, the estimated effect of private ownership on XJR  is strongly positive in Russia, while it is 
initially slightly negative in Ukraine, but then becomes positive and similar in magnitude to 
Russia’s coefficient during the late reform period.  It thus appears that privatization has had a 
positive effect on job flow heterogeneity in both countries, but this came about more quickly in 
Russia. 
 Turning to Product Market Dispersion , the results indicate that a more dispersed structure 
was associated with slightly lower XJR in Soviet Russia.  The impact on XJR becomes strongly 
positive in Russia postreform, while the effect in Ukraine is positive but much weaker.  These 
results are consistent with the more rapid progress in Russian liberalization policies, which 
permitted a stronger effect of competitive pressures than did the slower liberalization in Ukraine. 
The impact of Labor Market Dispersion on XJR  is positive, except in late reform Ukraine.  
Since the Russian XJR  coefficient is positive already in the Soviet period and there is no clear 
trend upward during the transition, we cannot conclude that labor market liberalization has led to 
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increased job flow volatility where potential competition exists.  By these indicators, therefore, 
product market liberalization has tended to increase the volume of labor restructuring in Russia, 
while product and labor market liberalization appear to have rather little association with the 
restructuring level in Ukraine.  
 Capital intensity is negatively associated with XJR in Soviet Russia, but the coefficient 
becomes positive and large in Early Reform Russia, while it remains negative in Ukraine.  The 
positive association appears to be inconsistent with the interpretation that capital intensity reflects 
adjustment costs. 28  The Russian XJR  coefficient for wages is negative in the Soviet period, but 
both Russian and Ukrainian coefficients become strongly positive under reforms, which is also 
inconsistent with the adjustment cost interpretation.  We suspect that the positive wage 
relationship in these countries reflects the abrupt demand shifts and large labor mobility costs: 
firms creating jobs are forced to pay higher  wages to attract workers. 
 On the other hand, XJR  is increasingly negatively affected by size over time in both 
Russia and Ukraine, the results stronger for the former than the latter.  Thus, the results on the 
adjustment cost proxies give mixed evidence on whether firms are becoming more sensitive to 
adjustment costs—only the results for size are consistent with this interpretation.29  
5. Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth 
The discussion so far has documented the evolution of the magnitude, persistence,  
heterogeneity, and covariates of job flows among old manufacturing firms during the course of 
reforms in Russia and Ukraine.  How do these flows, particularly the increased pace of job 
destruction in this sector, relate to productivity?  Has the downsizing process been creative or 
cleansing, in the sense of contributing to productivity growth by eliminating less productive jobs?  
Or would it be better characterized as neutral with respect to productivity, or even as destructive, 
resulting in the elimination of the more productive jobs in the Russian and Ukrainian economies?  
Has the implied productivity impact of job reallocation changed as reforms have been 
implemented?  Does the productivity relationship vary with ownership or market competition, and 
how do these patterns compare across Russia and Ukraine in transition and relative to Soviet 
Russia? 
                                              
28 Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p. 50) report that XJR declines with capital intensity, but Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999, p. 2747) report a positive association in simulations controlling for a host of other firm 
characteristics. 
29 There is some multicollinearity between capital intensity, wages, and size, but the qualitative results remain 
little changed when we include each of these variables separately, with the exception that the coefficient on 
capital intensity in late reform Russia becomes negative (–0.71). 
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We address these questions by building on a decomposition method proposed by Foster, 
Haltiwanger , and Krizan (2001), and we also present a decomposition based on Olley and Pakes 
(1996).30  Foster, Haltiwanger , and Krizan (2001) report the cross-industry averages of the within-
industry relationship of employment share growth and labor productivity in the U.S., and we 
extend this approach by adding an aggregation of the cross-industry relationships to total 
manufacturing sector productivity.  A possible difficulty with this extension is that measurement 
constraints, chiefly the availability of only gross output rather than value-added in the data and 
imperfect measures of relative price and quality changes, may create problems in interpreting the 
cross-industry job flows–productivity relationship.  We believe that the considerable interest in 
accounting for aggregate productivity dynamics outweighs these problems, but they should be 
borne in mind when interpreting the intersectoral results below.31  A further extension in our work 
is to move beyond the simple decompositions to investigate the statistical significance of the 
relationships implied by the decomposition terms (for instance, the covariance of productivity 
level and employment share growth), and to estimate the association of these relationships with 
privatization and competition and how these may have changed in the pos treform period.  The 
methodology and results from this extension are discussed in the next section. 
The basic decomposition expresses aggregate productivity change, ∆P t as follows: 
 
( )1 1 1 1t it it it it t it eit eit
i i i e
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,  (6) 
 
where S is the weight (share) of a firm or industry, t indexes years, i indexes industries, and e 
indexes enterprises within industries, so that P it is average productivity of sector i in year t and Peit 
is the productivity of enterprise e in sector i in year t.  The first term in this expression refers to 
the cross-industry weighted average of industry-average productivity gains; the weights are 
defined as the previous shares in order to fully distinguish average productivity growth from 
                                              
30 We also investigated a decomposition developed by Griliches and Regev (1995), which produces results that 
are very similar to those reported here and are available on request. 
31 Our data contain value-added only in Ukraine and only for 1994–1997.  As a check on our results, we then 
recomputed the decomposition with this measure, producing quite similar results to those we report using gross 
output.   For both countries and all years, we also investigated the results from using conventional producer price 
indices rather than output deflators; again the results differ little.  The potential problems notwithstanding, the 
practice of including intersectoral job flows in the decomposition is not unprecedented; Baily, Bartelsman, and 
Haltiwanger (2001), for instance, decompose annual changes in aggregate manufacturing labor productivity into 
firm-level components associated with changes in productivity and in labor shares in total manufacturing 
employment. 
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composition effects.  The second term measures the productivity consequences of intersectoral 
reallocation, compositional changes in industries weighted by previous year deviation of industry 
productivity from the aggregate mean.  The third captures the covariance between intersectoral 
reallocation and average sectoral productivity growth.  The fourth measures the covariance of 
intersectoral and intrasectoral reallocation, while the fifth term reflects the joint covariance of 
intersectoral changes, firm-level productivity growth, and intrasectoral composition.  The first 
term in (6) is the one studied by Foster, Haltiwanger , and Krizan (2001), following whom it may 
be further decomposed as follows: 
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The firm term in (7) measures the average change in firm productivity holding composition 
constant at its previous year structure, the “within-firm” effect, which may be interpreted as a 
common technology shock for all firms.  The second term measures intrasectoral compositional 
changes, weighted by the previous year deviation of enterprise productivity from the industry 
mean.  The third term measures the intrasectoral covariance of productivity and compositional 
changes.  Each of these terms is computed for each industry and then the weighted sum is 
computed, where the weights are previous year industry employment shares. 
 Combin ing Equations (6) and (7) produces seven terms, the calculations of which are 
shown in Table 8 for each year and for Russia and Ukraine separately.  Productivity is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the output–employment ratio, and firms and industries are weighted by 
employment shares.32  Starting with the first component, the results suggest that within-firm 
productivity change is negligible in the Soviet period, but highly negative in the early 1990s in 
both Russia and Ukraine, reflecting a common negative productivity shock early in the transition; 
it then becomes positive in the late 1990s as both economies recover.33  The procyclicality of the 
within-firm effect implied by this pattern is also characteristic of the U.S. manufacturing sector, as 
has been demonstrated by Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001).  The Pearson correlation 
coefficient between annual manufacturing output growth and the within-firm effect is 0.63 in their 
                                              
32 As described in the Data Appendix, our output measure is gross output, and our employment measure includes 
a full-time equivalent calculation for part -time workers, while it excludes “nonindustrial workers” who provide 
employee benefits.  In their analysis of labor productivity in U.S. manufacturing, Baily, Bartelsman, and 
Haltiwanger (2001) use shipments as the output measure, and they report productivity results per worker and per 
hour of work (the latter imputed for nonproduction workers).  These differences in definitions (as well as the 
differences in coverage of our data) should be borne in mind in the comparisons below. 
33 Blanchard and Kremer (1997) argue that productivity in transition economies declined due to hold-up 
problems among firms operating in thin input markets, although the magnitude of the decline may be somewhat 
overstated due to imperfect price deflation, as we noted earlier. 
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U.S. data, while we find the correlations between these variables to be -0.78  in Soviet Russia, 0.89 in 
transitional Russia, and 0.83 in Ukraine.  The cyclical behavior of this term therefore provides 
another example of a striking change of behavior: from countercyclical in the Soviet period to 
procyclical during the transition, as in the U.S. 
Turning to the terms involving compositional change, or reallocation, the magnitude of all 
the covariance terms is negligible in both countries and all periods, as might be expected since 
they involve the products of small numbers.  The results for both the intrasectoral and 
intersectoral effects are practically zero in Soviet Russia, suggesting that the reallocation carried 
out by the central planners during this period was not effectively guided by productivity 
differences.  Both effects become significantly positive as reforms are introduced, however, and 
they remain so throughout the period, with the exception that the intersectoral effect in Russia 
declines in the late 1990s as the economy recovers.  The intersectoral effect is quite large 
throughout the transition in Ukraine, but the intrasectoral effect grows much more slowly than in 
Russia, converging only in the late 1990s.  These results, particularly concerning the intrasectoral 
effect, constitute strong evidence that economic reforms improved the efficiency of the job 
reallocation process.34 
How do these reallocation components relate to aggregate fluctuations?   For the U.S. 
manufacturing sector, Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001) report that the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between annual output growth and the total reallocation effect (equal to the 
sum of our intra- and intersectoral effects) is –0.31, implying countercyclical behavior and 
reflecting the “cleansing” effect of recessions (Caballero and Hammour, 1994).  The analogous 
figures in our data are 0.86 for Soviet Russia, –0.57 for post-Soviet Russia, and 0.50 for post-
Soviet Ukraine, which again imply a much greater degree of convergence for Russia than for 
Ukraine. 
 Similar conclusions can be drawn from an alternative productivity decomposition 
methodology, due to Olley and Pakes (1996).  This approach involves a cross-sectional 
decomposition of labor productivity for each industry: 
 
 ( )( )∑ −−+=
e
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The first term is the unweighted average of industry productivity, and the second term, “cross,” 
shows whether activity is disproportionately located in high productivity firms (if the term is 
                                              
34 The large intersectoral effect may reflect the importance of structural change across larger sectors, but, as 
discussed above, the magnitude of the intersectoral effect should be treated with some caution due to imperfect 
relative produ ctivity measures and price deflators. 
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positive) or low productivity firms (if the term  is negative).  Changes in the ratio of the cross term 
to aggregate productivity reflect the extent to which the allocation of activity has become more or 
less productivity-enhancing over time.  As explained by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), 
an advantage of this method compared to Equations (7) and (8) is that differences in productivity 
cross-sectionally are less affected by measurement error and transitory shocks.  In addition, the 
method permits every valid annual observation on a firm to be included, even if it has missing 
values in the previous year, for instance.  
The results from this exercise, taking the weighted average by employment of each 
industry’s cross-sectional decomposition, are displayed in Table 9.  The conclusions are similar to 
those from the earlier method.  The ratio of the cross term to weighted average firm productivity 
is very low during the Soviet period, suggesting that jobs tend to be distributed independently of 
productivity and that there is little tendency under this system for job reallocation to raise 
productivity. 35  After reforms begin, the ratio grows quite substantially in both countries, but it 
rises much more quickly in Russia than in Ukraine.  This provides further evidence that reforms 
may have stimulated produc tivity-enhancing resource reallocation.  
The cross-sectional decomposition in Table 9 also provides further insight into the 
cyclical fluctuations of the productivity components.  While the unweighted average productivity 
declines considerably during the early reform years in both countries, the weighted average 
productivity declines by much less due to the strong tendency for labor to move toward more 
productive firms.  This effect is more than twice as strong in Russia than in Ukraine, implying a 
more effective cleansing process.  Although not shown in the table, we may also note that when 
the expansions begin in the last two years of the data, the growth in the relative contribution of the 
cross term slows and is even partially reversed in the final year.  Indeed, the timing of the peak in 
the ratio is quite closely associated to the turnaround in aggregate output, which began to grow 
strongly in Russia already in 1999, while Ukraine’s growth was only modestly positive in 1999 
and first became strong in 200 0. 
In conclusion, both decomposition methods provide evidence that job flows in the Soviet 
economy were not only small in magnitude but also bore little systematic relationship with 
productivity.  During this period, moreover, the implicit cyclical patterns of the elements of the 
decomposition are just opposite to the patterns observed in Western data.  Beginning in the early 
                                              
35 This result can be seen most clearly in the annual calculations that lie behind the averages presented in Table 
9:  the annual figures are remarkably stable during the Soviet period, showing little tendency for jobs to move in 
productivity-enhancing directions.  From 1992, however the “cross” term rises strongly and steadily in both 
countries. 
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1990s, when liberalizing reforms were adopted, the situation changed rapidly and productivity 
growth due to job reallocation emerged in both countries.  Indeed, it appears that these 
reallocative effects work to offset productivity decline in the early reform period and constitute a 
major fraction of productivity growth in the late reform period.  The intrasectoral effect emerges 
more quickly in Russia, the more active reformer in the early transition.  The cyclical patterns of 
the elements of the productivity decomposition in Russia become quite similar to those in the 
U.S., while Ukraine shows less convergence, in particular in the cyc licality of the between-firm 
reallocation effect. 
6.  Determinants of Productivity-Enhancing Job Reallocation 
 The results from the productivity decompositions suggest that economic reforms 
stimulated productivity-enhancing reallocation of employment.  In order to explore the impact of 
reforms more fully, this section proposes a regression method for estimating the effects of private 
ownership and product and labor market competition, and it presents the results from this analysis.  
The method also permits us to assess the statistical precision of the effects of intra- and 
intersectoral reallocation on productivity that we presented in the previous section. 36 
To motivate our method, it is useful to express the intrasectoral effect in Equation (7) as a 
covariance, namely as 
,                   (9)                                                      
 
where n refers to the total number of sampled firms in all industries and the notation is otherwise 
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where α̂  is an estimated intercept and ˆeitu  is an estimated residual.  The intersectoral effect in 
Equation (6) can similarly be calculated as γ̂  from 
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36 Tybout and Westbrook (1995) and Pavcnik (2002) analyze the effects of import liberalization on productivity 
growth by comparing intrasectoral reallocation effects across industries; they find larger effects in traded than in 
nontraded goods sectors.  Our regression methods permit us to consider several policies simultaneously, control 
for other factors, distinguish policy effects at both the firm and industry levels, and assess the statistical 
significance of changes in behavior after reforms. 
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where φ̂ , γ̂ , and îtv  are OLS estimates of the intercept, coefficient, and residual, respectively, I  
denotes the number of industries in the sample, and the notation is otherwise the same as in 
Equation (6). 
The usefulness of these expressions lies in the possibility to express β̂  and γ̂  (and 
potentially α̂  and φ̂ ) as functions of other variables, including firm characteristics, and thus to 
compute the impact of changes in those variables on the extent of productivity-enhancing job 
reallocation.  If we permit β̂  and γ̂  to vary only across the five country-periods in our data (also 
including these five dummy variables into the intercept), the point estimates in this analysis are 
the same as the averages for the corresponding years in Table 8.  The t-statistics associated with 
the coefficients in these estimates provide evidence that not only was the increase in productive 
reallocation greater in Russia, but also that the relationship was statistically more significant. 
Our main interest, however, concerns the effects of privatization and liberalization policies 
on productivity-enhancing reallocation within and between sectors.  Concerning the intrasectoral 
reallocation effect, we permit β̂  in Equation (11) to vary with the firm-level variables Ever 
Private, Private, Product Market Dispersion, and Labor Market Dispersion.  Concerning the 
intersectoral reallocation effect, we allow γ̂  in Equation (12) to vary with the industry means of 
Ever Private and Private, and the weighted averages of Product Market Dispersion and Labor 
Market Dispersion for firms operating in the industry.  These interaction eff ects are further 
permitted to vary by country and time period, so that we may assess any fluctuations over time in 
the relationships.  The inclusion of the Ever Private variable controls for the possibility of 
selection bias in the privatization process, resulting in a regression-adjusted difference-in-
differences estimator for the effect of private ownership on the extent to which reallocation is 
productivity-enhancing.  These specifications permit an assessment of the effects of corporate 
governance and effective market competition, first, in encouraging more productive firms to 
expand relative to less productive ones within each industry and, second, in encouraging more 
productive industries to expand relative to the less productive ones in the economy (or 
manufacturing sector) as a whole.  Are privatization and competition associated with stronger 
productivity-enhancing effects of job reallocation? 
The results shown in Table 10 provide some evidence on this question.  Starting with Ever 
Private, the coeff icient for Soviet Russia suggests that firms that would later be privatized have an 
only slightly greater tendency than those that would remain state-owned to reallocate labor within 
their sector productively; thus there is little difference in preprivatization behavior.  After the 
Russian firms were privatized, however, the results imply that productivity growth is raised by 
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about 1.7 percentage points (1.3 in the early reform period and 2.1 in the late reform period) 
relative to firms not yet privatized.  In Ukraine, by contrast, privatization is estimated to have a 
smaller effect in both the early and late reform periods.  Concerning the intersectoral effect, the 
proportion of industry employment in privatized firms has no statistically significant effect on the 
productivity of intersectoral reallocation in either country or period. 
Turning to Product Market Dispersion, we find no relationship with the productivity of 
intra- or intersectoral reallocation in Soviet Russia.  Liberalization results in a negative effect on 
the productivity of intrasectoral reallocation in the early reform period in each country, though the 
coefficient is statistically significant only in Ukraine.  In the late reform period the effect becomes 
significantly positive in Russia, while moving only to zero in Ukraine. 37  This result is consistent 
with more effective pressures from product market competition in Russia than Ukraine.  
Concerning the effects of intersectoral reallocation on productivity, product market dispersion 
appears to have had an immediate postreform effect in both Russia and Ukraine.  The estimates 
imply that it remains marginally significant in late-reform Ukraine but becomes insignificant in 
Russia. 
Concerning Labor Market Dispersion, we again find for the Soviet period that there is no 
effect on the intrasectoral or intersectoral reallocation-productivity components.  During the 
transition, however, the intrasectoral effect becomes positive, with Ukraine again lagging Russia.  
No relationship is found between labor market dispersion and the productivity of intersectoral 
reallocation.  
These results provide evidence that the extent to which job reallocation enhances 
productivity growth may indeed be a function of the economic policy and institutional 
environment.  In the Soviet period, market structure had little relationship with productive 
reallocation, while firms to be privatized exhibited little difference (in this sense) from those 
destined to remain state-owned.  After privatization took place, there was a sharp jump in the 
contribution of privatized firms to productivity-enhancing intrasectoral reallocation in Russia, but 
there was relatively little in Ukraine, where privatization was carried out much more gradually 
and with a stronger bias towards insider giveaways.  Liberalizing reforms brought strong effects 
of product market competition and somewhat weaker effects of labor market competition on 
productivity-enhancing intrasectoral reallocation.  Taken together, the results may help explain 
                                              
37 As a rough approximation for gauging the coefficient magnitude, we may make the assumption that all firms 
in an industry have equal size.  In this case, a one-unit increase in Product Market Dispersion  represents a  
doubling in the number of product market competitors.  A similar approximation is useful for interpreting the 
magnitude of the coefficient on Labor Market Dispersion. 
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why the Russian ref orm package stimulated more productive intrasectoral labor reallocation than 
did the Ukrainian in the early reform period. 
7.  Conclusion 
Previous research on job creation and destruction has revealed broadly similar patterns 
across developed market econom ies, including high rates of job reallocation, substantial 
persistence in annual flows, large heterogeneity among otherwise similar firms, and negative 
covariance of job flows with firm size, capital intensity, and average wage.  There is also evidence 
that job reallocation tends to be systematically related to productivity differences across firms.  
Despite the size of the literature on these topics, however, economists are only beginning to study 
the potential effects of policies and institutions on job flow patterns and the extent to which they 
are productivity-enhancing.  
In this paper, we have exploited remarkable firm-level data to investigate some extreme 
examples of how economic policies and institutions may affect job reallocation.  It is frequently 
supposed that employment determination functioned very differently under Soviet socialism, but 
there has been little prior analysis of the consequences of this system for job flows and their 
productivity consequences.   The rapid changes in institutions and policies in the early 1990s and 
the different reform programs pursued by Russia and Ukraine provide an opportunity to examine 
the consequences for job reallocation.  We not only compare the broad patterns of flows and their 
productivity consequences in the two countries—an undertaking that is facilitated by the identical 
coverage and variable definitions in our data as well as by the common origins of the two 
countries in the Soviet Union —we also examine micro-level differences across firms in 
ownership and in competitive pressures from product and labor markets.  Our approach, therefore, 
has not been to provide a complete description of job flow patterns in these economies, a task 
which is beyond the scope of our data, but rather to exploit the quasi-experimental situation of 
institutional and policy change and to focus on the set of enterprises that experiences these 
changes.  For this purpose, our manufacturing census data for the inherited sector of medium and 
large-sized enterprises from 1985–2000 are well suited. 
Our analysis finds extremely low rates of job reallocation in Soviet Russia and a 
negligible contribution of reallocation to aggregate productivity growth.  These results contribute 
in an important way to our understanding of the poor performance of the Soviet system, as they 
support an evolutionary view of the system’s drawbacks: while central planning may have 
functioned adequately in a static environment requiring little active reallocation of resources, it 
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was much less effective in dynamic  responsiveness to shocks requiring learning and selection—
weeding out less efficient activities and promoting those that have become more productive.38  
That the Soviet system functioned quite differently from market economies is underlined by our 
results concerning a number of patterns of job flows during this period, including how they vary 
with firm characteristics and with aggregate fluctuations. 
We also find that liberalizing reforms in the two largest Soviet successor states have 
brought substantial increases in job reallocation and in the productivity-enhancing consequences 
of the reallocation process.  Among the “old” manufacturing firms of both Russia and Ukraine, 
the patterns of job flows—their magnitude, heterogeneity, and cyclic al properties—have tended to 
become much more similar to those documented in Western economies.  By contrast with Russia, 
however, the Ukrainian increase appears to have been somewhat slower, and the rise in the 
contribution of intrasectoral reallocation to productivity appears smaller.  Our examination of the 
effects of privatization and competitive pressures from product and labor markets on excess job 
reallocation and on the productivity-enhancing effect of job reallocation shows substantially 
stronger relationships for Russia than for Ukraine. 
These results have important implications for the debate over the optimal pace of reforms 
in transitional economies.  At least for the manufacturing firms in the two countries studied in this 
paper, the results suggest that a more aggressive reform strategy produces greater job reallocation, 
faster job creation, and less net employment decline.  Moreover, while much of the previous 
research on the transitional process has been preoccupied with the effects of privatization and 
liberalization on firm-level performance, this paper has shown that a potentially more important 
set of effects from these policies works through their impact on the reallocation of resources 
across firms.39 
Ukraine’s transitional policies have frequently been labeled “gradualist,” compared to 
Russia’s “shock therapy,” yet the macroeconomic performance records of the two countries show 
rather similar patterns.  Aggregate output, for instance, displayed a similarly dismal trend for most 
of the 1990s, leading some observers to question the value of rapid privatization and 
liberalization.  The microeconomic evidence presented here, however, is consistent with the view 
that reforms have stimulated firm-level restructuring and reallocation in both countries, and that 
the employment reallocation has become productivity-enhancing.  In the early reform period, the 
                                              
38 Schum peter (1942) was perhaps the first to emphasize the role of factor reallocation in capitalist growth.  See 
Murrell (1992) on the evolutionary view of central planning and reform. 
39 For a survey of firm-level restructuring and its determinants in transition al economies, see Djankov and 
Murrell (2002). 
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reallocation effects served to reduce the magnitude of productivity decline, and more recently they 
have accounted for a major fraction of productivity growth.  These effects came about more 
quickly and strongly in Russia than in Ukraine, consistent with the hypothesis that faster and more 
effective policy reforms serve to stimulate productive reallocation.  
 
Data Appendix 
The basic sources for the firm panel data in this study are annual industrial registries 
provided by the State Committees for Statistics in Russia (the Goskomstat) and Ukraine (the 
Derzhkomstat).40  During the Soviet period, these two statistical agencies were both parts of a 
single organization (also called the Goskomstat), and they have maintained essentially identical 
reporting procedures for the industrial registries that they have continued to maintain.  Thus, the 
data are not beset by the problems of comparability plaguing many cross-countries studies using 
micro-data.  The definitions of employment, output, and industrial classification (OKONKh) are 
identical in Russia and Ukraine, the same as they were in the Soviet Union.  One exception to this 
discussion concerns the definition of private ownership, an issue that arises only after reforms 
have begun, and that we had to deal with by bringing in an additional data source for Ukraine.  
This procedure and the definitions of all variables are given in detail below. 
The coverage of the two countries’ registries is also quite comparable.  In Soviet Russia, 
the data include the universe of civilian industrial enterprises, while after 1991 all industrial firms 
with at least 100 employees plus all firms that are at least 25 percent owned by a legal entit y are 
supposed to be included. 41  Because most industrial firms are large and nearly all of them were 
state-owned in 1992, the coverage is very high in 1992: the firms in the Russian registry 
accounted for 90.5 percent of officially reported total industrial employment, while the Ukrainian 
covered 94.1 percent in that year.  The coverage rate in relation to official employment declined 
somewhat thereafter, falling by the year 2000 to 69.8 percent in Russia and 85.2 percent in 
Ukraine, no doubt due at least partially to the entrance of new small firms owned by individuals, 
since the registries do not include such entities.  Our focus, therefore, is on the “old” sector of 
firms inherited from the Soviet Union.  All state-owned and privatized firms are included 
regardless of size and reorganization (split-ups and spin-offs), because the nature of the 
privatization process was that legal entities (including the state) typically ended up with 
substantial shareholdings (Earle and Estrin, 1997).  Moreover, there have been few cases of 
genuine shutdowns in these countries (those bankruptcies that have taken place typically 
involving transfers of control), so our analysis includes nearly all the manufacturing assets 
inherited from the socialist system. 
Although the registries cover firms from all of the industrial sectors, we restrict the 
analysis in this paper to firms in manufacturing industries, eliminating mining and industrial 
services, in order to improve comparability with other studies.  In Russia, we also exclude firms 
classified as “public organizations,” which are nonprofit firms, and those belonging to the 
ministry of culture, the environment, health, or the interior—the database contains a number of 
prison-based firms. 
To eliminate implausible outliers, we excluded observations with large employment 
changes scaled by size as follows: firms with below 50 employees in one year that grow to over 
250 in the next, firms with between 50 and 199 employees that grow over 120 percent or  under   
                                              
40 The Russian industrial registries were also supplemented by information from registries compiled separately, 
including special registries on joint ventures, and the Ukrainian registries were supplemented by State Property 
Committee data on ownership. 
41 Firms subordinated to the State Committee for the Defense Industry are excluded.  See Earle and Komarov 
(2001) for some discussion of this sector. 
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–170 percent (calculated as a ratio to the average of current and previous year employment 42), 
firms with employment between 200 and 499 growing over 100 percent or under –150 percent, 
and firms with employment of 500 or more growing over 80 percent or under –130 percent.  The 
labor productivity decompositions also exclude observations for firms in pairs of years where 
annual labor productivity growth (again scaled by the mean of the current and previous year 
values) exceeds 100 percent or is smaller than –100 percent.  The number of outliers eliminated 
according to these procedures amounted to only a trivial fraction of the original sample. 43 
Finally, the sample for the productivity analysis is reduced due to missing values for 
output, and those for the regressions on employer characteristics are reduced because of missing 
values in the latter set of variables.  Appendix Table 1 shows the numbers of observations 
associated with each of these sample construction procedures. 
Our data cleaning and preparation procedures paid a great deal of attention to longitudinal 
links across firms.  All of our data sources included not only an identifying code for the firm, but 
also name and address, information which we used together with industry, region, and size to link 
firms that had exited the registry with firms that had entered in any given year.  Because it is 
doubtful that there is much if any genuine exit and entry among the large and medium-sized 
manufacturing firms in these countries, the remaining exits and entries in the data are spurious, 
reflecting reorganizations such as split-ups and spin-offs.  In order not to count these 
reorganizations as employment changes, our analysis considers continuing firms only. 
For the purpose of comparing our results with those from other studies, we should 
emphasize some other limitations of the data.  Similar to other sources in East European 
economies, our data pertain to firms rather than establishments, although this distinction may be 
relatively unimportant in Russia and Ukraine, where most manufacturing firms consist of single 
plants.44  Moreover, many of the larger firms provide separate reports for “subsidiaries” (not 
separate legal entities, but distinct plants).  Also like most other East European sources but 
different from typical Western data, our employment concept is an annual average rather than 
referring to a particular date or month, and it excludes “nonindustrial personnel” (chiefly, workers 
providing social benefits to employees).  Because the concept concerns a legal entity, measured 
employment growth includes changes associated with spin-offs, acquisitions, and other changes in 
firm boundaries, and, as noted above, genuine entry and exit cannot be distinguished from either 
reregistration or reporting anomalies. 
These differences from the measures typically employed in Western studies could create 
significant differences in the magnitudes of job flows, and while a recent paper by Brown and 
Earle (2002b) has recently provided evidence from survey data that the differences induced by 
these characteristics are small, they should be borne in mind in the comparisons with Western 
studies.  We provide such comparisons only as a way to benchmark our findings for the “old” 
firms inherited from the Soviet Union, the behavior of which is the focus of this paper. 
 
Variable Definitions and Construction 
Capital Intensityt is the rank order of firms by capital intensity in year t, calculated by dividing the 
average book value of fixed assets used in the main activity of the enterprise by employment.  
Capital stock is adjusted for revaluations, which take place at the end of some years, using 
information on the end-of-year and beginning-of-year values.  The rank of capital intensity is 
expressed in a range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the most capital-intensive. 
                                              











12 , sometimes expressed as a percentage. 
43 Although we consider these outliers most likely to be mistakes in the data, they are so few that including them 
would have little or no impact on our conclusions. 
44 Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996, p. 61) show that the size distributions of job flow magnitudes based on 
firm and establishment for the same sample are very similar. 
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Employmentt is the average number of “registered industrial production personnel” (including 
both production and non -production workers, but excluding “nonindustrial personnel” chiefly 
involved in providing employee benefits) in year t.  The concept includes the full-time equivalent 
number of part- time workers registered at another firm ( “sovmestiteli ”). 
Ever Privatet is a dummy = 1 if the firm is over 50 percent privately owned in the year 2000 (or 
by the last year it appears in the data), 0 otherwise.  
Labor Market Dispersiont = –ln(Herfindahl-Hirschman index of employment concentration in the 
municipality in Russia and county [raion] in Ukraine) in year t, calculated using the industrial 
registries.  Our database includes firms in 3,655 municipalities in Russia and 642 raions in 
Ukraine. 
Labor Productivityt = ln(Outputt/Employmentt). 
Outputt is the value of gross output produced in year t, net of VAT and excise taxes, expressed in 
constant prices in both countries.  The nominal values were deflated using implicit deflators 
calculated by dividing the growth in nominal output at the three -digit OKONKh (ten-sector) level 
by a growth in physical volume index for Russia (Ukraine).45 
Privatet  is a dummy = 1 if the firm is over 50 percent privately owned in year t, and = 0 otherwise  
The ownership data upon which this is based for Russia are annual ownership codes in the 
registries.  For Ukraine we use annual State Property Committee data on the percentage of shares 
in private hands.  If a firm is not found in thos e data, we include it as a state firm in all years if it 
has a state ownership code in the 2000 registry.  Otherwise it is excluded from this part of the 
analysis, since we do not know the percentage of shares that are private.  Note that the nature of 
the registry data (described above) implies that Private refers to privatized, formerly state-owned 
entities. 
Product Market Dispersiont is the product market dispersion measure in year t.  Dispersion 
indices at the regional (oblast) and national levels are obtained as –ln (Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index of product market concentration in the five-digit OKONKh industry) at the regional (oblast )  
and national level, respectively.  A weighted average of these is constructed using the proportion 
of regions with at least one enterprise in the five-digit industry in year t to weight the national 
dispersion, and one minus this proportion to weight the regional dispersion measure.  Russia and 
Ukraine use the same industrial classification system throughout the period.  In Russia, there are 
260 five-digit industries represented in the data while in Ukraine there are 241.   There are 82 
Russian and 28 Ukrainian oblasts represented in the data.  The Russian figure is smaller than the 
total of 89 regions (“subjects of the Russian Federation”) because several smaller districts 
(okrugi) are grouped together with surrounding regions, and the database does not cover 
Chechnya and Ingushetia. 
Waget is a ranking of average wage rates in year t, calculated by dividing the total wage bill by the 
average industrial employment.  Firms are ranked by average wage with the ranks expressed in a 
range from 0 to 1, where 1 is the highest average wage.  
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Job Flow Rates in Russian and Ukrainian Manufacturing (%) 
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 Average Annual Job Flow Rates, By Period 
Soviet 










(0.45) 108,545  N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Early Reform  











































Note:  JC = job creation; JD = job destruction; JR = job reallocation; NC = net employment growth; XJR = excess job reallocation; all of these are calculated as rates with 
respect to average employment across the two adjacent years.  N = sample size (number of firm-year observations).  Standard errors in parentheses.  The star (*) signifies 
that the Ukrainian rate is statistically significantly different from the Russian rate at the one percent level.  “N.A.” indicates not available. 
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Table 2  
Average Annual Job Flow Persistence Rates (%) 
 
 Creation Persistence  Destruction Persistence 
 1-Year 2-Year  1-Year 2-Year 
Soviet Russia 69.9 55.0  92.8 91.4 
      
Reform Russia 58.5 34.2  89.4 81.5 
      
Reform Ukraine 59.1 36.4  92.6* 87.3* 
Note:  The Soviet 1-year and 2-year persistence rates are calculated for creation and 
destruction occurring between 1985–1992.  The reform period 1-year persistence is calculated 
for job flows between 1992–1999 and the 2-year persistence is for 1992–1998. The star (*) 
signifies that the Reform Ukraine rate is statistically significantly different from the Reform 
Russia rate at the one percent level. 
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Table 3  
Distribution of Annual Employment Growth Rates (%) 
 
 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% Mean Std Dev 
Soviet Russia -20.2 -12.9 -5.8 -1.4 1.2 7.3 14.9 -1.9 15.9 
Early Reform Russia -43.8 -32.3 -18.3 -7.2 0.6 10.3 21.1 -8.8 24.3 
Early Reform Ukraine -32.9* -24.7* -14.7* -6.4* 0.0* 5.4* 10.3* -8.2* 16.4 
Late Reform Russia -54.5 -33.7 -15.4 -3.6 3.8 14.3 25.4 -7.4 28.8 
Late Reform Ukraine -46.5* -31.0* -16.2* -6.7* 0.2* 9.2* 19.2* -9.2* 24.7 
Note:  The star (*) signifies that the Ukrainian rate is statistically significantly different from the Russian rate at the one percent level.  For the percentiles, these 
tests come from quantile regressions using bootstrapped standard errors with 100 repetitions. 
 39 
Table 4 
Average Annual Job Flow Rates by Sector (%), 1992 -2000  
 
 Russia  Ukraine 
 JC JD  JC JD 
All Manufacturing 2.79 9.96  1.70* 10.10 
Fuel 4.36 4.99  3.12 2.63 
Ferrous Metallurgy 3.70 5.70  2.83 3.25* 
Non-Ferrous Metallurgy 4.32 7.13  3.93 6.06 
Chemicals 2.72 6.77  1.39* 9.08* 
Machine-Building 1.75 11.59  1.01* 12.63 
Pulp and Paper  4.01 10.61  1.65* 11.49 
Construction Materials 2.92 8.82  1.38* 10.06* 
Light  2.19 14.50  1.47* 12.49* 
Food Processing 4.85 7.44  3.08* 6.88 
Note:  The star (*) signifies that the Ukrainian rate is statistically significantly different from the Russian 




Percentage of Excess Job Flows Between Five -Digit Industries 
 
 Russia  Ukraine 
Soviet  13.0 N.A. 
Early Reform  18.6 16.5 
Late Reform  14.3 13.9 
Note:  These figures reflect average annual calculations of the decomposition of XJR into between- and 
















Ever Private  0.828  0.816  0.515  0.814  0.530 
Private  0.000  0.489  0.117  0.798  0.468 




























Note: Means are shown for all variables, and standard deviations (in parentheses) are shown for continuous 




Table 7  












Ever Private 0.27  -0.59  -1.92  0.53  -2.75 
Private ---  1.12  -0.18  1.15  1.22 
Product Market Dispersion  -0.37  0.39  0.05  0.33  0.06 
Labor Market Dispersion  0.21  0.53  0.17  0.17  -0.07 
Capital Intensity  -0.38  0.58  -0.32  0.00  -0.56 
Wage  -0.06  2.29  0.70  1.44   2.04 
Employment  -0.26  -0.59  -0.48  -1.50   -1.10 
Note:  These coefficients are calculated on the basis of Equation (5) in the text. 
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Table 8  
Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth  
 







Soviet Russia 0.0055 0.0004 0.0020 -0.0009 0.0035 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0000 
Early Reform Russia -0.1193 -0.1710 0.0265 -0.0035 0.0271 0.0016 -0.0002 0.0002 
Early Reform Ukraine -0.1776 -0.2428 0.0136 -0.0009 0.0474 0.0057 -0.0000 -0.0003 
Late Reform Russia 0.0634 0.0360 0.0256 -0.0063 0.0077 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
Late Reform Ukraine 0.0666 0.0030 0.0275 0.0004 0.0349 0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0001 
Note:  Using equations (6) and (7) in the text, total productivity growth is tP∆ , the within-firm effect is ∑ ∑ −− ∆
i e
eiteitit SPS 11 , the intrasectoral effect is ( )∑ ∑ −−−− −∆
i e
iteiteitit PPSS 1111 ,  
the intrasectoral covariance is ∑ ∑ ∆∆ −−
i e
eiteitit SPS 11 , the intersectoral effect is ( )∑ −− −∆
i
titit PPS 11 , the intersectoral within covariance is ∑ ∑∆∆
i e
eiteitit SPS , the intersectoral 
between covariance is ( )∑ ∑ −− −∆∆
i e
iteiteitit PPSS 11 , and the intersectoral covariance covariance is ∑ ∑ ∆∆∆
i e
eiteitit SPS . 
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Table 9 












Soviet Russia 2.790 2.756 0.035 0.012 
Early Reform Russia 2.339 2.117 0.223 0.096 
Early Reform Ukraine 5.912 5.734 0.179 0.030 
Late Reform Russia 2.419 2.037 0.381 0.158 
Late Reform Ukraine 5.604 5.274 0.330 0.059 
Note:  As in Equation (8) in the text, weighted average productivity is ∑
i
itit PS , unweighted average  
productivity is it
i
it PS∑ , and cross is ( )( )∑ ∑ −−
i e




The Effects of Private Ownership and Market Competition on Productivity-
Enhancing Job Reallocation:  Within- and Across-Industry Regressions  
 
 Intrasectoral Effect Intersectoral Effect  
PD*SovietRussia 0.002     (1.29) -0.005   (-0.99) 
PD*EarlyReformRussia 0.018     (2.53) 0.021    (1.19) 
PD*EarlyReformUkraine 0.018     (3.84) -0.000   (-0.02) 
PD*LateReformRussia  0.005     (1.15) 0.000    (0.02) 
PD*LateReformUkraine 0.014     (1.67) 0.014    (1.04) 
PD*EverPrivate*SovietRussia 0.003     (2.92) -0.003   (-0.78) 
PD*EverPrivate*EarlyReformRussia  0.009     (2.45) -0.006   (-0.20) 
PD*EverPrivate*EarlyReformUkraine -0.003    (-1.36) -0.063   (-2.30) 
PD*EverPrivate*LateReformRussia -0.010    (-2.39) 0.023    (0.77) 
PD*EverPrivate*LateReformUkraine -0.006    (-1.03) -0.058   (-1.02) 
PD*Private*EarlyReformRussia 0.013     (3.32)   0.002    (0.35) 
PD*Private*EarlyReformUkraine 0.005     (1.86) 0.016    (0.94) 
PD*Private*LateReformRussia  0.021     (5.46) -0.031   (-1.01) 
PD*Private*LateReformUkraine 0.010     (1.88) 0.021    (0.59) 
PD*ProdDisp.*SovietRussia  -0.001    (-0.73) 0.003    (1.71) 
PD*ProdDisp.*EarlyReformRussia -0.004    (-1.15) 0.016    (2.61) 
PD*ProdDisp.*EarlyReformUkraine -0.003    (-2.84) 0.074    (3.71) 
PD*ProdDisp.*LateReformRussia 0.007     (3.22) 0.005    (1.10) 
PD*ProdDisp.*LateReformUkraine -0.000    (-0.12) 0.065    (1.65) 
PD*LaborDisp.*SovietRussia 0.001     (1.47) 0.003    (1.57) 
PD*LaborDisp.*EarlyReformRussia 0.005     (3.68) -0.007   (-1.21) 
PD*LaborDisp.*EarlyReformUkraine 0.000     (0.17) 0.006    (0.51) 
PD*LaborDisp.*LateReformRussia 0.003     (2.46) 0.004    (1.08) 
PD*LaborDisp.*LateReformUkraine 0.005     (2.01) -0.006   (-1.13) 
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.143 
N 216,868 5,432 
Note:  These are OLS regressions with t statistics, adjusted for firm clustering, reported in parentheses.  
The specifications also include five period-country effects, main effects for all the variables, and all two-
way interactions.  In the first column of results (based on Equation (10) in the text with β  permitted to 
vary by country, time period, ownership and market structure), PD is the lagged deviation of the firm’s 
productivity from the industry average ( 11 −− − iteit PP ) divided by nit-1*Var( 11 −− − iteit PP ), where nit-1  is 
the number of firms in industry i in year t-1.  In the second column (based on Equation (11) of the text 
with γ varying by country, period, and average industrial ownership and market structure), PD represents 
the analogous lagged difference in productivity between the industry and the average for all 
manufacturing ( 11 −− − tit PP ), scaled by the number of industries times the variance of this difference.     
Early and late reform refer to 1993–1996, and 1997–2000, respectively, while Soviet Russia refers to 




Appendix Table 1  












Total sample 141,371 113,216 33,463 92,730 33,716 
– nonmanufacturing 105,344 82,854 27,709 71,216 28,631 
– “public organizations” 104,217 80,099 No Info. 69,001 No Info.  
– employment outliers = Sample 1 103,920 79,916 27,668 68,481 28,490 
– missing firm characteristics = Sample 2 73,743 61,201 26,782 40,109 26,075 
– firms with missing output  100,860 74,199 27,385 64,291 27,116 
– productivity outliers = Sample 3 99,542 68,876 25,708 56,620 22,599 
– missing firm characteristics = Sample 4 74,005 58,575 24,589 41,713 17,986 
Note:  The total sample includes all observations on employment growth.  As described in the text, firms engaged primarily in non-manufacturing 
activities, those classified as “public organizations,” and a small number with absurdly large employment changes were deleted, yielding the sample 
studied for measurement of job flows, Sample 1.  Those missing information on firm characteristics (average wage, capital intensity, ownership, product 
and labor market concentration) are excluded from Sample 2, used for the job flows – employer characteristics regressions.  Firms with missing 
information on output and with unbelievably large changes in labor productivity are excluded from Sample 3 for the productivity analysis, and those 
missing ownership or product and labor market concentration are excluded from Sample 4, used for the firm-level job-reallocation-productivity regression. 
 
